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KYBERNETIKA — VOLUME 11 (1975), NUMBER 5 
Semantics Based on States of Affairs 
MIROSLAV MLEZIVA 
A small change in the construction of states of affairs given in [1] enables us to formulate all 
semantic concepts in terms of states of affairs and facts only. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In [ l ] a variant of the theory of states of affairs was outlined. The disadvantage 
of this variant is that the states of affairs are assigned to synthetic formulas only. 
The semantic notions of satisfaction, truth etc. were defined in terms of states of 
affairs only for the case of synthetic formulas. We cannot obtain these concepts in 
general. 
In the present article a new variant of the theory of states of affairs is given, which 
enables us to formulate the semantic concepts for arbitrary formulas. This variant 
may be, therefore, a basis for development of semantics. 
Main difference consists in the fact that in the new variant we can eliminate only 
the unessential occurrences of J — F-terms but we cannot eliminate the occurrence 
of D1. Therefore, for every formula we obtain a state of affairs, i.e. a pair, the first 
member of which consists at least of D1* 
This difference provokes two essential changes of our conception. First, we need, 
in the case of logically true formulas, the state of affairs, the second member of 
which is a proper class (i.e. not a set). We apply, therefore, a strong variant of the 
set-theoretical ontology in which it is possible to construct ordered pairs with proper 
classes as members. 
Furthermore, in contrast with [ l ] , we cannot start with the concept of truth-value 
assignment. The starting point of our semantic constructions must be the concept 
of state of affairs and the concept of fact. By these concepts the concept of satisfaction 
For the construction of states of affairs see [1]. 
320 and other semantic concepts must be defined. Indeed, in this case, we must prove the 
adequacy of the concept of satisfaction defined in this manner for the customarily 
used notion of satisfaction. 
Most definitions and theorems in the present article are the same as in [ l ] . We 
shall give them without proofs and comments. For typographical reasons we shall 
introduce some unessential changes in our notation. 
2. THE LANGUAGE L, ITS METALANGUAGE 
AND ONTOLOGY OF L 
The language L is an arbitrary language of applied first-order predicate calculus 
with identity. The logical constants are as follows: 
- ! , - > , - , + , • , (V), (3), = . 
The extralogical constants of L are following: 
au a2, ••., a„ (individual constants) 
Pu P2, ..., Pm (predicates; a predicate P, is fcrary). 
The variables of Lare as follows: 
xu x2, ..., xp, ... (the number of variables is unlimited). 
The concept of a formula of L, of a sentence of L and other syntactical concepts are 
defined as customary. The result of replacing of B by C in A is designed by A(BJC). 
The metalanguage ML of the language L contains following variables for arbitrary 
expressions of L: 
A, B, C, D, Au Bu Cu Du A2,... 
and following logical symbols: 
- , - > , & , v , - , ( ) , ( £ ) , = . 
The ontology of Lis the domain of all objects constructed by the principles of the 
set theory of Bernays-Morse (in the formulation given in [2]). 
The ML-variables for objects of ontology are as follows 
a,p,y,5,<xupuyu5ua2,... 
They have arbitrary classes as values. The membership relation is denoted as e. 
A set is a class being a member of some class. When a class is not a set, it is a proper 
class. The universal class Vis the class of all sets.* 
The symbol {...:...} is the abstraction operator (class of all sets..., that it holds...). 
The operations and relations 
u , n , \ (difference), — (complement), x , <=, = 
are defined for arbitrary classes. The operation {...} forms a class from sets. The 
symbol 0 designs the empty set. The class of all unempty sets U is defined as follows: 
U = V\ {0} . 
We suppose that our ontology contains the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, .... 
The concept of ordered pair <a, /?> is defined in a usual way only for the case of 
sets a and fi. We need, however, ordered pairs also in the case, when a and /? are 
proper classes. We adopt a device cited in [2] and we define the ordered pair as 
follows: 
|{{a}, {a, P}} , if a and P are sets , 
\(a x {0}) u (p X {l}) , if a or /? are proper classes . 
The second part of this definition satisfies the condition 
<«, p) = (y, <5> = a = y & p = <S . 
The variables for arbitrary formulas of set theory are as follows: 
s/, <M, <€, 3), s/u @u <eu <?!, s/2,.... 
The principle of abstraction: 
(a) (a is a set & s/(a)) = a e {/? : s/(a\p)} (s4 does not contain p) ; 
(b) (<a,, ..., a,-> is a set & s/(at, ..., a;) = 
= <a1; ...,«,> e {<&, ..., j8,> : sJ(aJpu ..., a;//?;)} 
(sf does not contain /?., ..., /?,). 
In contrast with [1], there are no truth-values in our ontology. 
* When we assume in our ontology also the existence of individuals (Urelemente), some 
principles of the set theoretical basis must be changed, e.g. the following equivalence cannot hold: 
a is a set = a e V . 
(see e.g. [3]). Our constructions are not dependent on these changes. 
322 3. INTERPRETATION, VALUATION AND TRANSLATION 
Definition 1. The interpretation of L is a function I assigning 1) a domain of 
interpretation D1 to the language L and 2) exactly one denotatum l(A) to every 
constant A in I such that: 
l(A) e D1, if A is an individual constant, 
1(A) is an k-ary relation on D1, if A is a k-ary predicate. 
The variables for arbitrary interpretations are as follows: 
I, J,K,IU JUKUI2  
Definition 2. The valuation of variables in I is a function V1 assigning to every 
variable A exactly one value V(A) such that V\A) e Dl. 
The variables for arbitrary valuations in J are as follows: 
V, U1, W, V\,V\, W[, V\,..., 
(or without index /, when the use in the given context is clear). 
For the sake of simplicity of the text, we define a generalized concept of value for 
variables and constants in V and / . 
Definition 3. 
If A is a constant of L, then vv(A) = 1(A), 
if A is a variable of L, then vv(A) = V'(A) . 
We call the terms vr(A) I — V-terms. The sentences constructed from the formulas 
of set theory by replacing of variables by / — V-terms or by the term D1 will be called 
I — V-sentences. We shall use also the variables 
s/, ®, <€, 9, s4u &u
 ceu <?!, st2  
for arbitrary J — V-expressions (i.e. / — V-sentences or I — V-terms). 
Definition 4. 
(1) If A is a k-ary predicate and Au ..., Ak are individual terms, then the I — V-trans-
lation of A(AU ..., Ak) is the ML-sentence 
<[vv(A1),...,vv(Ak)yevv(A); 
(2) if A and B are individual terms, then 323 
the I—V-translation of A = B is the ML-sentence Vy(A) — Vy(B) ; 
(3) if A is a formula and si is its I—V-translation, then 
the I—V-translation of ~~\A is the ML-sentence ~si ; 
(4) if A and B are formulas and sf and & are their I —V-translations, then 
the I—V-translation of A . B is the ML-sentence si & £ 
the I — V-translation of A + B is the ML-sentence si v 
the I -V-translation of 4 => B is the ML-sentence si -> 
the I —V-translation of AoB is the ML-sentence si = 
(5) if A is a formula and si is its I — V-translation and xt is a variable, then 
the I—V-translation of (Vxt) A is the ML-sentence 
(xl)[aieD'-+sS(vv(xMal)] 
the I —V-translation o/(3x;) A is the ML-sentence 
(£a;) [a, eD'Sc s*(v#x,)/«,)] . 
Let us define the one-one correspondence between variables of L and variables 
of ML such that for every i the variable JC,- corresponds to the variable at and vice 
versa. Then it is clear that to every formula A of L there is exactly one J — V-translation 
of A and vice versa. The set of / — V-translations of formulas of L is a proper subset 
of the set of J — V-sentences. 
We bring a few theorems about J — V-sentences. The first of them is identical with 
Theorem 4 proved in [1]. We make only some changes in the notation. 
Theorem 1. / / si is a K-U-sentence containing exactly the K — U-terms 
Vv(At), ..., r*(A.) and possibly D
K, then 
(I) (V) [_s*(K\l, U/V)] = (jS) ( « . ) . . . (a,) [co(P, ax,..., af) -> 
- sJ(D*\f!, v%At)laL,..., 0&4,)/«i)] . 
By s/(KJI, U/V) we mean the result of replacing of K by J and of U by Vin si. 
The condition m(p, als ..., a,) is a abbreviation for 
P e U & off & . . . & 0)"p' , 
324 where 
off is ag e fi, if Ag is an individual term , 
is a cz ft x . . . x p, if A is a fc-ary predicate . 
Analogically, the condition co(DK, at, ..., a;) is an abbreviation for CO^K & .. . & CO^K, 
where 
of$K is ag e D
K, if Ag is an individual term , 
i s a 9 c D
K x ... x DK, if Ag is a fc-ary predicate . 
k-tjmes 
In [1] these conditions are written without the abbreviation of the conditions 
limiting the quantificators. We shall use these abbreviations also in connection with 
abstraction-operators (e.g.) 
{<£, «! , . . . , a/> : co(P, a,,..., a,.) & s/} 
mean 
{<JS, a t , . . . ,«,> : [(jSe U&c^
1 &. . .&coJ ' )& < ] } • 
The following two theorems are evident consequences of Theorem 1.: 
Theorem 2. If jtf is a K—U-sentence containing exactly the K-U-terms 
vK(At),...,v^(At), then 
(I) (V) [s*(K\l, U/V)] ^ (I) ( « . ) . . . («,-) [co(D', « „ . . . , «;) -
-> (sJ(vK(A,)\au ..., v%At)M{Kll, U/V)]) • 
Theorem 3. i / j / is a K — U-sentence and vK(At), ...,v
K(A^) are only some of 
K—U-terms contained in it, then 
(/) (V) [st(K\l, U/V)] = (/) (V) («.) ... (a,-) [co(D>, «.,...,«,.) -> 
- (s*(vKMi)K - . t%At)l«d(Kll, U/V))] . 
Note. On the right-hand side of equivalence in the Theorem 2. there must be the 
quantificator (/) because the formula in [...] contains D>. But this formula does not 
contain V. On the right-hand side of the equivalence in the Theorem 3. there must 
be both (I) and (V), because s/(K\l, U/V) contains still some I- V-terms (originally 
K— U-terms) not replaced by variables. Therefore, it contains / and V. 
4. STRONG EQUIVALENCE 
As in [1] we define three following auxiliary concepts: 
Definition 5. If A and B are formulas of L, then A and B are extensionally iso-
morph in I and V (abbreviated: EISV(A, B)), iff there are constants or variables 
free in A: A^-.^A-, and there are constants or variables free in B: Bi,...,Bit 
such that tv(Ai) = vv(B^) and ... and vv(A) = vv(B) and " A " = "B(B]/A l5 ..., 
Definition 6. If A and B are formulas of L, then A and B are + strongly equivalent 
in I and V (abbreviated: +STREQV(A, B)), iff there are formulas of L C and D 
such that: EISy(A, C) and EISV(B, D) and (K) (U) ((% = 9>) (IJK, VjU)), where <g 
and 3) are the I —V-translations of C and D. 
Note. In [1] was used L-EQ(C, D) (C and D are L-equivalent) instead of the third 
member of the conjunction in the defmiens of the present definition. 
Definition 7. / / A is a formula of L and B is a constant or variable free in A, 
then A essentially contains B, iff (El) (EV) [stf =£ (a) jtf(vy(B)jai)\, where caD, is 
ofDi 
customary and s4 is the I ~ V-translation of A. 
The concept of strong equivalence (STREQ) is now defined as follows: 
Definition 8. If A and B are formulas of L, then STREQV(A, B), iff the two follow-
ing conditions are satisfied: 1) + STREQV(A, B) and 2) for every C contained essen-
tially in A there is a D essentially contained in B such that vv(C) = vv(D) and vice 
versa (where C is a constant or a variable free in A and D is a constant or variable 
free in B). 
The concept STREQV(A, B) expresses our intuitive ideas about the situation 
when A and B speak (in / and V) about the same thing (about the same state of 
affairs in / and V). 
5. ABSTRACTION 
The construction of states of affairs for given formula contains the application 
of three operation: abstraction, elimination and reduction. The operation of abstrac-
tion consists in application of certain form of the principle of abstraction defined 
for I — F-sentences. 
326 We call the order of the / - V-terms in the following sequence 
(L) v&Px),..., vr(Pm), vY(ai), ..., vv(an), vr(Xl),..., vv(xp), ..., 
the lexicographical order of J— V-terms. Given an i-tuple of I — V-terms 
t ^ ) , . . . , ^ , ) , 
the lexicographical permutation of the i-tuple mentioned is the i-tuple, in which each 
/— V-term on the left precedes in the lexicographical order (L) each member on the 
right. We shall designate this lexicographical permutation as follows: 
vv(ALl),...,rr(ALt). 
The form of the abstraction principle for our purposes using the lexicographical 
permutation of/—V-terms is as follows: 
Theorem 4. If si is an I — V-sentence containing exactly the terms vv(A^), ..,vv(At) 
and possibly the term D1, then 
si = <£>', vv(ALl), ..., vv(AL)y e {</?, aLl, ..., aLi} : \co(P, a,,..., a,) -> 
- ^(DIlP,vriA1)lai, .'..,4(A[,/a,)]} 
(where the condition co(P, a1; ..., a;) is the same as in the Note about Theorem l) 
Definition 9. If si is a K — U-sentence, then ABSL(si) is the result of application 
of the Theorem 4 on si'. 
Theorem 5. ABSL(si) = si, in every I and V, where si is a I—V-sentence. 
Theorem 6. If si and 38 are K — U-sentences containing the same K — U-terms 
vK(A,), ...,vl(A^),then 
(P) (a,) ... (a,) {(o(fi, «.,..., «,) -> [si(DKlP, vKv(A,)\at, ..., »g(4-)/-i) • 
= ®(DK\p,vK(Ai)K...,vl(A)\*m-
= [{</?, a., ..., a;> : co(p, «., ..., at)&si(D
K\p, vK(A,)\au ..., ^ , ) / « , ) } = 
= {</?, au ..., a;> : co(p, a., ..., at)&^(D
K\p, v^A^a,,..., ^(A .)^)}] . 
(This theorem is identical with Theorem 11 in [1].) 
Theorem 7. If si and 39 are K-U-sentences containing the same terms 327 
v^(Ai),...,vu\Ai),then 
(/.) (Bl) . . . (a,) {co(/J, a „ ..., «,) -> [^(D
K/iS, ^ ( A ^ / a , , ..., i>5(.4,)/a,) -
- . ^ ^ ^ ( A O / a . , . . . , ^ , ) / ^ ] } -
= [{</?, a 1 , . . . , a J > : c < ) S , a 1 , . . ; , a ( ) & ^ ( D
K / ^ ^ ( A 1 ) / a 1 , . . . , t ; ^ A , ) / a l ) } c 
c {<i?, a t , . . . , a;> : <w(/S, a., ..., a ;)&^(D
K/jS, ^ ( A J / a , , . . . , t>*(A,)/a,)}] . 
(This theorem follows from the principle of abstraction and the definition of in-
clusion.) 
Theorem 8. If si and 3$ are K — U-sentences containing the same terms 
v%(At),..., vl(A), then 
(I) (V) (si = a) (K\I, U/V)] = [{</?, at, ..., a;> : oo(p, a., ..., a,) & 
& sJ(DKjp, ^ ( A O / a , , . . . , t$A ,)/a ()} = 
= {</?, a t , . . . , a;> : co(P, a., ..., a,) & 38(D
Kjp, vftAjfa, ..., t$A ()/a .)}] . 
(This theorem corresponds to Theorem 12 in [l] .) 
6. REDUCTION 
The operation of I— V-reduction is the same as in [ l ] (the following theorems are 
proved in [ l ] ) . 
Definition 10. If s4 and 38 are I—V-terms, then si is the I — V-reduced term of 
38, iff si is the lexicographically first member of the set of I—V-terms having the 
same denotatum as 38. 
Definition 11. If si is an I—V-sentence containing exactly I—V-terms 
vY(A^),..., vv(A) and vv(B^),..., vY(B) are their I—V-reduced terms, then the 
I—V-reduced form of si (abbreviated: Rv(si)) is the sentence 
si(vv(Al)lv}(B1),...,vv(At)lvl(Bi)). 
Theorem 9. For every I and V: Rv(si) = si, where si is an I—V-sentence. 
Definition 12. / and V define an analogical reduction as K and U, iff for every 
terms AandB it holds: vY(A) is I — V-reduced term of vY(B), iffv^(A) is K — U-reduced 
term of v%B). 
The abbreviation for the concept just defined is as follows: Ry = Ry. 
We may express the same idea by a ML-condition as follows: 
Theorem 10. Ry = RK, iff for every terms A and B it holds following: 
vv{A) = vr{B) = v
K{A) - vK(B) . 
Theorem 11. / / si and 3% are I — V-sentences, then 
Rr(si = SS) = [Ry{s4) = Ry(3S)] . 
Theorem 12. / / si is a K — U-sentence, then 
{I) (V) [(RK(si)) {Kjl, U/V)] = (/) (V) [(*.! = RK) -> s*(KJI, U/V)] . 
Theorem 13. If A and B are formulas of Land si and 33 are their K — U-transla-
tions, then 
+ STREQK(A, B) = (/) (V) [(Rv = R
K) - (si = 3t) (Kjl, U/V)] . 
7. ELIMINATION 
The main difference from [ l ] consists in the fact that we define the elimination 
only as ELI Mi in [1]; we do not consider the elimination of D1. 
Definition 13. / / si is a K — U-sentence and 38 is a K — U-term, then si contains 
essentially 38, iff (El) (EV) [si =fe (a) (co(DK, a) - si(38\a) (Kjl, U/V))]-
Definition 14. If si is a K—U-sentence and 33 is a K — U-term, then si contains 
unessentially 33, iff si contains 33 but not essentially. 
Definition 15. / / si is a K — U-sentence containing unessentially exactly the 
K-U-terms vK(At),..., v
K(A,), then the eliminated form of si (abbreviated: 
ELIM(si)) is 
(a,)... (a) [co(DK, au ..., a) -+ si^A^a,,..., t$<4,)/a.)] • 
Theorem 14. For every I and V.ELIM (si) = si, where si is an I — V-sentence. 
8. STATES OF AFFAIRS 
Under given / and V we can construct for every formula A of L a state of affairs 
assigned to this formula A in the interpretation I and valuation V (abbreviated: 
yv(A)) in the unique manner. Let stf is the /— V-translation of A; first we transform 
si in the eliminated form ELIM(si), secondly in the I — V-reduced form Rv(ELlM(si)) 
and finally in the abstraction-form ABSL(Rv(ELIM(si))). This abstraction-form -
let we designate it as a e /? — is uniquely determined and, therefore, the members 
a and /? are uniquely determined, too. The state of affairs £fy(A) is the ordered pair 
<a, py. In contrast with [1] the present construction assigns a state of affairs to an 
arbitrary formula of L (not to a synthetic formula only). 
Definition 16. / / A is an L-formula and si is its I—V-translation, then 
Sfv(A) = <«, py, if "a 6 /?" is identical with "ABS
L(RY(ELlM(s4)))". 
The existence of states of affairs for non-synthetic formulas is now guaranteed 
by change of the procedure of elimination: we cannot eliminate the term D1 and, 
therefore, the abstraction is possible in every case. 
As in [1] we can see the form of a state of affairs more detailed in the following 
theorem: 
Theorem 15. If A is an formula of L and si is its I—V-translation, then 
#>y(A) = «Dl,Vy(ALl), ...,Vy(ALt)y , 
{<j?,aLl,...,aLf> :[co( /? , a i , . . . , a;) & 
& Rv(ELIM(st>)) (D'jp, i^AOK- • • •> ^-.)/«.)]}> . 
where vv(Ax), ..., vv(A,) are all term resting in Rv(ELIM(si)). 
The theorem of adequacy holds for changed states of affairs without restriction to 
synthetic formulas only. 
Theorem 16. If A and B are arbitrary formulas of L, then 
STREQV(A, B) = yv(A) = ^r(B) . 
The proof of this theorem is identical with the proof given in [1] except for the 
argument that for synthetic formulas there exists always an (i + l)-tuple of the 
objects abstracted from Rv(ELIM(si)) (where si is the I— V-translation of A). 
This argument is changed in the following way: in the new construction of states of 
affairs we can never eliminate the term Dl and, therefore, the (i + l)-tuple mentioned 
above will exist in every case (for arbitrary formulas). 
9. FACTS AND SATISFYING 
Now, we can define the fundamental concepts of the extensional semantics in 
terms of states of affairs. First, we must distinguish between "facts" and states of 
affairs which are not "facts".We introduce the predicate " . . . is a fact" (abbreviated: 
"FACT(...)") as follows: 
Definition 17. 
FACT((.a, py) = (EI) (EV) (EA) (A is a formula & <<x, J?> = S"V(A) & a e £ ) ; 
(a pair <a, /?> is a fact, iff (a, /?> is the state of affairs assigned to some formula A 
in some interpretation I and in some valuation Vand it holds that a e f>). 
From this definition it follows 
Theorem 17. If A is a formula and Sfrv(A) = <a, /?>, then FACT(S^^(A)) = ae/}. 
It holds, furthermore, the following theorem: 
Theorem 18. If A is a formula and stf is its I—V-translation, then 
FACT(Sfl(AJ) = ABSL(Rl(ELlM(st))) = st. 
Proof. Let Sfy(A) = <a, jS>. Then the sentence ABSL(Rl(ELIM(si?))) is identical 
with "a e P". Because FACT(S*y(A)) = a e 0 (by Theorem 17) it holds that 
FACT(Sfy(A)) is equivalent with ABS^R^EL/M^))) and also with s4 (Theorems 
5, 9 and 14). 
Now, we introduce a relation defined on formulas, interpretations and valuations 
" A is satisfied by Vin J" (abbreviated: SAT'(A, V)). 
Definition 18. / / A is a formula, then SAT\A, V) = EACT(^(A)). 
In [ l ] the concept of satisfaction was defined in the usual manner on the ground 
of the function assigning truth-values to formulas. But in the present development 
of semantics we do not dispose of the concept of truth-value assignment. We define 
the satisfaction of a formula A in J and V by saying that the state of affairs assigned 
to A in 7 and V is a fact. This definition is a new one and we must first prove its 
adequacy, i.e. we must prove that the new concept SAT has (extensionally) the same 
properties as the customary concept of satisfaction. 
First, we must prove an auxiliary theorem. 
Theorem 19. If A is a formula and stf is its I— V-translation, then (a,) (a, e D1 -»• 
-* s4(vy(x^\a?) = s4v for every valuation U1 differing from V at most in the value 
for xt; where si
v is an I —U-translation of A (therefore: "s4v" = "j/(V/U)"). 
Proof. The expression on the left-hand side of the equivalence means that 331 
j^(vy(x)l<Xi) holds for every member a, of D1. AH valuations U have as values for 
xt exactly all possible members of D' (on the other places they have the same value 
as V). Therefore, the statement that s#u holds under all valuations U' means exactly 
the same fact as the statement that s^(v'y(x^jo:) holds for every member a, of Dl. 
Now, we can prove the theorem about the adequacy of the concept SAT. 
Theorem 20. 
(1) If A is a k-ary predicate and Au ..., Ax are individual terms, then 
SAT'(A(AU ..., At), V) = < ^ ( A 0 , . » , "ft*.)) e v&A); 
(2) if A and B are individual terms, then SAT'(A = B, V) = Vy(A) = Vy(B); 
(3) if A is a formula, then SAT\~]A, V) = ~ SAT'(A, V); 
(4) if A and B are formulas, then SAT\A .B,V) = SAT\A, V) & SAT\B, V); 
(5) if A and Bare formulas, then SAT\A + B, V) = SAT\A, V) v SAT\B, V); 
(6) if A and B are formulas, then SAT\A => B, V) m SAT\A, V) - SAT\B, V); 
(7) if A and B are formulas, then SAT'(A o B, V) = SAT\A, V) = SAT\B, V); 
(8a) if A is a formula containing a free variable xh then 
SAT'((Vx,)A, V) = SAT\A, U) for every valuation U' differing from V 
at most in the value for x(; 
(8b) if A does not contain xh then SAT\(Vx^ A, V) = SAT\A, V); 
(9a) if A is a formula containing a free variable x„ then 
SAT\(lXi)A,V) = SAT'(A,U) for some valuation U
1 differing from V 
at most in the value for xt; 
(9b) if A does not contain xb then SAT\(3x) A, V) = SAT'(A, V). 
Proof. We shall prove the cases (l)'— (4), (8a) and (8b) only. The other cases 
are dependent on the cases mentioned. 
(1) SAT\A(Ay Ai),V) = FACT(2'l(A(Au...,Ai)). The right-hand side of 
this equivalence is by Theorem 18 equivalent with the / —F-translation 
^(A1),...,vy\Ai)->€vy(A). 
(2) SAT\A = B, V) = FACT((f'v(A = B)). The right-hand side is by Theorem 18 
equivalent with the / — V-translation Vy(A) = vl(B). 
(3) SAT'(lA, V) = EACT(^(-IA)). Let s<2 be the / - V-translation of A. The 
I— V-translation of H A is then ~stf and, therefore, the right-hand side of the equi-
valence is by Theorem 18 equivalent with ~s4. This sentence is (by Theorem 18 
again) equivalent with ~FACT(9'y(A)) and also with. ~SAT (A , V) (by Definition 
18). 
(4) SAT7(A . B, V) = FACT(^V(A . B)). Let again s4 and » be the / - V-transla-
tions of A and B. The / - V-translation of A . B is then s4 & 28 and, therefore, the 
right-hand side of the equivalence is by Theorem 18 equivalent with stf & 3$ and, by 
Theorem 18 again, is equivalent with EACT(^(^))& FACT(&l(B)). By Defini-
tion 18 we have, therefore, SAT'(A, V)& SAT'(B, V). 
(8a) SAT'((Vx,) A, V) = EACT^^Vx.) A)). The right-hand side is by Theorem 
18 equivalent with the /-V-translation 
(af) (af e D"-+ .*(»&..)/«,)). 
By auxiliary Theorem 19 this expression is equivalent with the statement that srfv 
holds for every valuation U' differing from Vat most in the value for x ;. This state-
ment means (by Theorem 18) that EACT(5"/J(A)) for every U1 mentioned and by 
Definition 18 that SAT'(A, U) for every U1 mentioned. 
(8b) In the case that A does not contain xt as the free variable the formula (Vx,) A 
is logically equivalent with A and, therefore, SAT7((Vx;) A, V) = SAT
J(A, V). 
The proof of the cases (5), (6), (7) and (9), (9b) is evident by the fact that the formu-
las having the form A + B, A => B,Ao B, (3x;) A are equivalent with some formulas 
containing the terms ~~|, •, (V) only. 
The concept SAT defined in Definition 18 is, therefore, adequate to the customary 
concept of satisfaction and it may be the foundation for development of semantics. 
Definition 19. If A and B are formulas, then 
A is true in I = (V )EACT (^(A ) ) (VER'(A)) 
A is false in I = (V) ~ FACT(#>V(A)) • (FALS'(A)) 
A is logically true = (/) (V) EACT(^(A)) (L-VER(A)) 
A is logically false = (/) (V) ~ FACT(S?y(A)) (L-EALS(A)) 
A and B are equivalent in I = (V) (FACT(^l(A)) = FACT(^V(B))) (EQ\A, B)) 
A and B are logically equivalent = (l) (V) (EACT(^/(A)) = FACT(^V(B))) 
(L-EQ(A, B)). 
10. STATES OF AFFAIRS FOR ANALYTIC FORMULAS 
In the preceding article [1] there was no possibility to define the concepts of logical 
truth and of logical falsehood in terms of states of affairs. The logically true and 
logically false formulas have assigned no states of affairs. In the present construction 
we do not eliminate the term D' for the domain of I and, therefore, the operation 
of abstraction is always applicable. We obtain a state of affairs in every case. Thus, 
Definition 19 is possible for arbitrary formulas. 
Let us look in detail at the states of affairs assigned to analytic formulas, i.e. to 
logically true and logically false formulas. First we prove an auxiliary theorem about 
the eliminated form of analytic formulas. 
Theorem 21. 7/ L-VER(A) or L-FALS(A) and si is the I-V-translation of A in 
an arbitrary I and V, then ELIM(si) contains no I—V-terms, but it contains D1. 
Proof. If L-VER(A) or L-FALS(A), then (/) (V) FACT(yv(A)) or (/) (V) ~ 
~ FACT($fy(A)). This means by Theorem 18: (/) (V) si or (l)(V) ~ si. From 
Theorem 2 we can see that the sentence si and the sentence ~si contains no /— V-
term essentially. Therefore, all terms must be eliminated by EL1M and the forms 
ELIM(si) and ELIM(~si) contain no /—V-terms. But they must contain the term 
D' because: 1) si or ~si contains D1 or 2) it contains at least an /—V-term. If it 
contains D1, then ELlM(si) or EL1M(~ si) contains D1 too. If si or ~si does not 
contain Dl, then D' appears in ELlM(si) or ELIM(~si) by elimination of some 
/—V-terms (see the definition of elimination). 
Now, we prove two theorems about the form of states of affairs assigned to analytic 
formulas. 
Theorem 22. / / A is a formula, then L-VER(A) = (/) (V) [ ^ ( A ) = (D1, [/>]. 
Proof. (I) Let (l) L-VER(A), i.e. by Definition 19 (2) (/) (V) F A C T ( ^ ( A ) ) . 
Furthermore, let si be the I - V-translation of A. From (l) it follows (by Theorem 21) 
that ELIM(si) and, therefore, also Rv(ELIM(si)) contains only D' and contains no 
I— V-term. This means that the abstraction-form of the sentence mentioned will 
contain on the left-hand side the term D' only. The form of the state of affairs will 
be as follows: 
(3) <£>', {P : p e U & R*(ELIM(si)) (D'/p)}) . 
Now, we must ascertain what class is on the right-hand side of (3). We can distribute 
the abstraction-operator between the members of conjuction: 
(4) {P : P 6 U} n {P : R^(ELIM(si)) (D'jp)} . 
The left-hand side of the intersection is equal with U; the content of the right-hand 
side can be ascertained starting from (2). The assumption (2) means by Theorem 18 
that (?) (V) stf and, therefore, by Theorems 9 and 14 that 
(5) (l)(V)Ry(ELM(st)). 
In accordance with the above ascertainment the sentence (5) contains only Dl and 
it is by Theorem 1 equivalent with 
(6) (p) [/? e U -> Ry{ELIM(st)) (D'jp)] . 
Furthermore, by Theorem 7, it follows from (6): 
(7) {P : P e U} c {/? : RV(ELIM(^)) (D'jp)} . 
Now, the left-hand side of (7) is U, the right-hand side is identical with the second 
member of the intersection (4). The inclusion (7) follows from the assumption (l) 
and the question what is the class on the right-hand side of (7) can be solved by the 
assertainment what classes a satisfy the inclusion U c oe. Evidently, there are only 
two classes a satisfying the inclusion mentioned: the class U and the universal class V. 
Therefore, the right-hand side of (4) can be identical either with U or with V. In the 
first case (4) is U n U, in the second case U n V. We can see that it follows from the 
assumption that the class (4) is in every case identical with U. From the fact just 
mentioned and from (3) we can conclude that the state of affairs of a logically true 
formula must be identical with <D/, U> in every J and V. 
(II) It holds also the converse. If (/) (V)l^v(A) = <D
r, U>], then evidently 
(/) (V)FACT(Sfv(A)), because D
1 e U in every / and V. This means that L-VER(A). 
Theorem 23. If A is a formula, then L-FALS(A) = (l)(V) [^V(A) = <D
r, 0>]. 
Proof. (I)'We suppose (l) L-FALS(A), i.e. (2) (l)(V) ~ FACT(Sr$(A)). Further-
more, let jf be the I — V-translation of A. Analogically as in proof of Theorem 22 
we can see that £fv(A) is 
(3) </>', {p:PeU& RV(ELIM(^)) (D'jp)}} . ' 
We must ascertain what class is the second member of (3). We transform again the 
expression for this member as follows: 
(4) U n {p : RY(EL1M(^)) (D'jp)} . 
It follows from the assumption by Theorem 18 that it holds 
(5) (l)(V)~Ry{ELIM(s?)). 
Analogically as above we have 
(6) (/?) [fi e U -> ~ R#ELM{st)) (D7//*)] 
and equivalently (by transposition): 
(7) (p) [Rv(ELIM(s*)) (D'jp) -> ~ p e U] . 
Furthermore, the following inclusion follows from (7) by Theorem 7: 
(8) {P : R%ELIM(s/)) (D'jp)} cz{p-.~PeU}. 
The class on the right-hand side is evidently {0}. What class can be a in the inclusion 
a c {0}? Evidently a can be either 0 or {0}. Therefore, if (4) is either U n 0 or 
U n {0}, the result is 0. Therefore, the first element of £fy(A) is D' and the second 
one is 0 in every I and V. 
(II) When (/) (V) \Sfly(A) = <£>', 0>], then (/) (V) ~ FACT(^^(A)), because 
D1 $ 0 in every / and V. This means that L-FALS(A). 
(Received April 17, 1975.) 
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